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1 Introduction
Two important questions for the organization of rms are the design of incentive contracts and
the allocation of tasks. We analyze two seemingly unrelated contractual regimes in principal
agent relationships: ex-ante randomization in incentive contracts and the allocation of tasks. It
is well known that randomization over simple contracts can be optimal in the second-best (e.g.,
Fellingham et.al. 1984, Arnott and Stiglitz, 1988). However, we rarely observe contracts that
include randomization and randomization is usually regarded as a technical result with little
relevance for real-world incentive contracts. On the other hand, contracts regularly specify some
allocation of tasks. Starting with Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), an extensive literature on multi-
task agency analyzes the optimal allocation of tasks. This literature focuses on e¤ort substitution
and argues that only one task should be allocated to an agent (or, more general, that tasks should
be homogeneous with respect to ease of performance measurement).
We identify a new rationale that determines the optimal allocation of tasks: the e¤ect of the
outside option. We analyze randomization in a simple model with one task and then develop a
multi-task model where the principal allocates working time across di¤erent tasks. Randomization
over wage schedules and the allocation of di¤erent tasks to one agent are similar in the sense that
the only reason to randomize or to allocate two tasks to an agent is to mitigate the e¤ect of the
outside option. In most contractual relationships, randomization is not feasible because parties
do not have access to a veriable randomization device. We show that the allocation of two tasks
to one agent can serve as a substitute for randomization.
Our result that it can be optimal to assign two tasks that are very di¤erent is the opposite
of the conclusions of the multi-task literature. The reason for the di¤erent results is that most
studies of multi-task agency use the linear model of Holmstrom and Milgrom. The linear model
is special in the sense that the outside option does not a¤ect the second-best contract except for
a transfer. Hence in the linear model, e¤ort substitution is the only factor that determines the
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optimal allocation of tasks.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we analyze randomization if there exists only one
task. In section 3 we analyze the allocation of tasks, relate our results to the multi-task literature
and show that the allocation of tasks can serve as a substitute for randomization. Section 4
concludes.
2 Ex-ante Randomization
The literature distinguishes between two types of randomization. Under ex-post randomization,
the wage depends on output and on a signal that is realized after the agent chooses an action
where the signal contains no information about the action that the agent has chosen. Under
ex-ante randomization, the contract species a lottery over wage functions that map output into
wages. Before the agent chooses an action, a signal determines which wage function is selected.
Of course, this signal cannot contain information about the action that the agent has not yet
chosen. We study ex-ante randomization but we also allow for contracts that include ex-post
randomization.
Consider a standard principal-agent problem. The principals payo¤ v(;w) =   w depends
on output  and wages w. The agent chooses an action a 2 A. Output is a stochastic function
of a. Let F (:ja) be the conditional distribution function of output with R dF (ja) < 18a 2 A.
The agents utility is u(w; a) with u0w > 0 and u
00
w < 0 8a 2 A. Let ub be the supremum of u with
ub <1. If the agent rejects the contract, he receives outside utility u < ub. The agent is possibly
protected by limited liability, i.e., w  l with l   1. There exists an independent random
variable e with generic realization  and c.d.f. G where  is realized after the agent chooses a.
Output and the realization of e are veriable while a is unobservable. If the wage depends in a
non-trivial way on e, the contract includes ex-post randomization. A contract without ex-ante
randomization consists of a measurable wage function w that maps output and realizations of e
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into R. An ex-ante random contract species a set of wage functions and a probability distribution
over this set of wage functions. From now on, non-random contract refers to a contract without
ex-ante randomization.
Suppose ex-ante randomization is not feasible. Consider the second-best problem for arbitrary,
nite outside utilities:
max
w;a
Z Z
v(;w(; ))dF (ja)dG() (1)
subject to:
a = argmax
a02A
Z Z
u(w(; ); a0)dF (ja0)dG() (IC)Z Z
u(w(; ); a)dF (ja)dG()  k (PC)
w(; )  l 8;  (L)
Let wk; ak be the solution to (1) subject to (IC), (PC), and (L) for  1 < k < ub. There
exists an extensive literature that discusses various topological restrictions on payo¤s, actions
and the stochastic relation between action and output that guarantee the existence of a second-
best contract (see Page, 1997, and literature cited therein). Since the focus of this paper is not
on existence but on randomization and job design, we assume that the non-random second-best
problem has a unique solution in the sense that ak is unique and that wk is unique except for a
set of outputs that is realized with probability zero.
Assumption 1: For all k 2 ( 1; ub) exist wk; ak where ak is unique and wk is unique except
for some set P of outputs with
R
P
dF (jak) = 0.
If ex-ante randomization is not feasible, the principal o¤ers the contract wu. Let rk denote the
rent under a non-random second-best contract with rk =
R R
u(wk(; ); ak)dF (jak; )dG() u.
Second-best rents can be positive for two reasons: limited liability and non-separability of the
utility function.
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An ex-ante random contract is binary if it selects only two wage functions with positive prob-
ability. Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) show that the principal cannot gain if the contract randomizes
over more than two wage functions. Proposition 1 gives conditions for ex-ante randomization,
shows that a second-best contract exists, and that second-best random contracts randomize only
over contracts that are the solution to the principal-agent problem when randomization is not
feasible and outside utility is some k 2 ( 1; ub). Assumption 1 does not guarantee that the
second-best random contract is unique. Proposition 1 shows that it is su¢ cient to consider binary
second-best contracts because every second-best random contract can be written as a probability
distribution over binary second-best contracts.
Proposition 1 (i) Consider ru > 0. If there exists k 2 ( 1; u) such that ak 6= au, then ex-ante
randomization is optimal.
(ii) If ex-ante randomization is optimal, there exists a second-best contract that is binary and
species two wage functions wk1 ; wk2 with k1 < u and k2  u + ru and probabilities rk2rk1 rk2 and
 rk1
rk1 rk2 that wk1 and wk2 are selected. The agent earns zero rent. The set of second-best contracts
is the set of probability distributions over binary second-best contracts.
(iii) If au = ak 8k, the non-random second-best contract wu is optimal.
Proof. (i) Let E [v(;wk)] =
R R
v(;wk(; ))dF (jak; )dG(). If there exists k 2 ( 1; u)
with ak 6= au, then Assumption 1 implies that E [v(;wk)] > E [v(;wu)] and that  1 < rk < 0.
Let  =  rkru rk . Consider a contract where wu and wk are chosen with probability  and 1   .
From the construction of  it follows that the agent accepts. If ex-ante randomization is not
feasible, the principals payo¤ is E [v(;wu)]. Hence the principals payo¤ is higher under the
random contract.
(ii) LetW be the set of all wk for k 2 ( 1; ub). The optimal contract never species a w =2W .
To see why, let br be the rent for some w =2 W . Note that br 2 ( 1; ub   u). Then the principal
could instead o¤er wbr and increase her payo¤while the rent does not decrease. Since u is bounded
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from above with u00w < 0 and v(;w) =  w, the optimal contract is not the limit where the rent
for one of the wage functions over which the contract randomizes approaches  1  u or ub   u.
Since (IC) and (L) have to be satised for every w over which the contract randomizes, the only
reason for ex-ante randomization is to mitigate the e¤ect of (PC). Since the objective function
and (PC) are linear in probabilities, the principal cannot gain if the contract randomizes over
more than two wage functions. Let wk1 ,wk2 denote the wage functions over which the contract
randomizes. Wlog. k1  k2. Since E [v(;wk)] is non-increasing in k, ex-ante randomization can
only be protable if E [v(;wk1)] > E [v(;wu)]. Hence k1 < u and rk1 < 0. Since the expected
rent has to be non-negative, rk2 > 0. If ex-ante randomization is not feasible, the principal o¤ers
wu with rent ru. Hence rk2  ru and, therefore, k2  u + ru. Since the random contract has to
satisfy (PC), E [v(;wk1)] > E [v(;wk2)] implies that the probabilities that wk1 ,wk2 are selected
are such that the expected rent is zero. Hence, if randomization is indeed protable, the problem
of the principal is:
max
wk1 ;wk2
rk2
rk2   rk1
E [v(;wk1)] +
 rk1
rk2   rk1
E [v(;wk2)] (A1)
It remains to show that there exists a binary second-best contract, i.e., that (A1) has a solution.
For all wk 2 W is the expected wage greater than  1. Together with
R
dF (ja) < 18a 2 A
this implies that E [v(;wk)] is bounded from above. Note that E [v(;wk)] is continuous from
the left and non-increasing in k. Since u is bounded from above, rk is bounded from above.
Note that rk is non-decreasing in k. If rk is continuous from the right we are done. To see
that a binary second-best contract exists even if rk is not continuous from the right, recall that
rk  k u. Suppose there exists bk such that lim
k!bk rk < limk!bk+rk. Then there exists  > 0 such that
lim
k!bk+rk = bk +    u. Since E [v(;wk)] is non-increasing in k, E [v(;wk+e)] is constant for all
0 < e  . From Assumption 1 it follows that the wage function and, therefore, rbk+e are constant
for all 0 < e  . Hence, if ex-ante randomization is optimal, (A1) has a solution and there exists
at least one binary second-best contract.
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If there exists more than one binary second-best contract, then any probability distribution
over binary second-best contracts yields the same expected payo¤ for the principal. Hence any
probability distribution over binary second-best contracts is a second-best contract. The argument
above that expected rents under a binary second-best contract are zero also applies to second-best
contracts that randomize over more than two wage functions. Hence any second-best random
contract can be written as a probability distribution over binary contracts for which the expected
rent is zero. Second-best implies that every binary contract that is chosen with positive probability
maximizes the payo¤ of the principal which is true only for binary second-best contracts.
(iii) As shown in (ii), the optimal contract never randomizes over a w =2 [wk and, therefore,
never implements an a =2 [ak. Randomization over two w that both implement au amounts to a
lottery over wages. Since u00w < 0 the principal cannot gain by randomization if au = ak 8k.
In general, the question whether ex-ante randomization is protable depends on the feasibility
of ex-post randomization. However, the conditions in Proposition 1 do not depend on whether
ex-post randomization is feasible. Under ex-ante randomization, the uncertainty is resolved before
the agent chooses an action but after he signs the contract. Hence, the participation constraint
has only to be satised in expectation and ex-ante randomization can be desirable to mitigate
the e¤ect of the participation constraint. Ex-ante randomization cannot be used to mitigate the
incentive constraint since for each wage function the corresponding incentive constraint has to be
satised. By contrast, ex-post randomization can be used to mitigate the e¤ect of the incentive
constraint if the risk-aversion of the agent depends on his action. Under ex-post randomization,
the uncertainty is resolved after the agent chooses an action. Hence, the incentive constraint does
not have to be satised for every wage function over which the contract randomizes but only in
expectation over wage functions.
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3 Job design
The multi-task literature emphasizes that each agent should work on one task. On the other
hand, many employment contracts specify explicitly or implicitly that employees spend a certain
amount of their working time on one task and the rest on another task. For example, it is
common that consultants spend part of their time with the client (acquiring information about
the needs/problems of the client, etc.) and part of their time in the o¢ ce (doing research, writing
reports, etc.). This type of contract species wages and an allocation of time across tasks but
makes no use of randomization. We refer to such a contract as job design. To see why the
assignment of two tasks can be protable, consider tasks i, j. Under job design, a contract
species an allocation of time across tasks and, for each task, a wage function. To make tasks as
heterogeneous as possible, suppose that the action for task i is veriable while the moral hazard
problem for task j is severe in the sense that an agent earns a rent in the second-best if he works
only on task j, i.e., ru > 0. Assigning both tasks can be protable if the rent from task j allows
to reduce the wage for task i while still satisfying the participation constraint.
Dynamic principal-agent problems are considerably more complex than the static problem.
We are interested in job design as a way to mitigate the e¤ect of the participation constraint.
We make two assumptions to prevent that other factors drive the allocation of time across tasks.
First, we assume that principal and agent have instantaneous payo¤ functions which depend on
current output, wages, and actions. Second, we restrict the class of contracts such that the wage
depends only on the current output and on the realization of e. Additionally, we assume that
ex-ante randomization is not feasible. These assumptions ensure that the allocation of time across
tasks is not driven by the savings behavior of the agent, by the production technology, or the fact
that the principal gets a more precise signal of the action if the agent works longer on a task.
To analyze job design in multi-task situations consider the model from section 2 with n tasks.
Let A1; A2; ::An be a partition of A where Ai is the action set of task i. Since we are interested
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in situations where the principal allocates time across tasks, we assume that the principal can
specify for each task i a time interval during which the agent is restricted to choose a from Ai.
Let u and v be instantaneous payo¤ functions and let  be a ow variable where the distribution
of (t) depends on the action in time t. Total time is normalized to one. A job design contract
consists of two parts. The rst part species for each task i a measurable wage function wi that
maps current output and the realization of e into R. The second part species an allocation T
of time across tasks with T : [0; 1] ! fA1; A2; ::Ang. To simplify notation, we sometimes write
wages as a function of T instead of the task with wT (t) = wi if T (t) = Ai. If the agent accepts
the contract, he chooses at every t 2 [0; 1] some ht : [t; 1] ! A subject to ht(et) 2 Ai if T (et) = Ai
to maximize his expected future payo¤
R R 1
t
R
u(wT (et)(; ); ht(et))dF (jht(et))detdG(). Note that
the optimal ht does not depend on earlier wages and actions. Hence we can assume wlog. that the
agent chooses only once a function h : [0; 1] ! A subject to h(t) 2 Ai if T (t) = Ai to maximize
his expected payo¤.
The principal solves the following job design problem:
max
(T;(wi)
N
i=1;h)
Z Z 1
0
Z
v(;wT (t)(; ))dF (jh(t))dtdG()
subject to (L) and
h(:) = argmax
Z Z 1
0
Z
u(wT (t)(; ); h
0(t))dF (jh0(t))dtdG()
h(t) 2 Ai if T (t) = Ai
Z Z 1
0
Z
u(wT (t)(; ); h(t))dF (jh(t))dtdG()  u (PC)
The solution of a job design problem is a triple (T; (wi)
N
i=1 ; h).
Similar to section 2, we are not interested in topological restrictions on payo¤s, actions and
the stochastic relation between action and output that guarantee the existence of a second-best
contract. Therefore, we assume that the principal-agent problem has a unique solution if the agent
can work only on one task. If the agent works only on one task, the principal o¤ers a contract that
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species a task and a wage function w. Let wsk, h
s
k be the solution to the second-best problem if
the agent can only work on a single task and his outside utility is k 2 ( 1; ub). Note that hsk
implicitly denes the task that the principal species and that the agent cannot be strictly better
o¤ if he chooses di¤erent actions at di¤erent points in time.
Assumption 2: For all k 2 ( 1; ub) exist wsk, ask where wsk is unique except for some set of
outputs P with
R
P
dF (jask) = 0 and hsk(t) = ask except for some t 2 T with
R
T
dt = 0.
Let rsk be the rent if the agent can only work on one task with r
s
k =
R R
u(wsk(; ); a
s
k)dF (jask)dG() 
u. Note that payo¤ functions and the class of contracts are deliberately chosen such that the op-
timal allocation of time across tasks is not inuenced by the production technology, the savings
behavior of the agent, or the objective to receive a more precise signal about the action.
A job design contract is binary if it allocates a positive amount of time to two tasks. Proposition
2 gives conditions such that a non-trivial allocation of time across tasks is optimal and shows that
second-best job design contracts can be written as an allocation of time across contracts that are
optimal if the agent can work only on one task and choose his action only once. If the second-best
job design contract is not unique, then the set of all second-best job design contracts is the set of
time allocations over binary second-best contracts.
Wlog. let asu 2 A1.
Proposition 2 (i) Consider rsu > 0. If there exists k 2 ( 1; u) such that ask =2 A1, there exists a
second-best job design contract that is binary and that allocates a positive amount of time to two
tasks i; j with wages wi = wski , wj = w
s
kj
and ki < u, kj  u+ rsu. The agent earns zero rent.
(ii) The set of second-best job design contracts is the set of time allocations over binary second-
best job design contracts.
(iii) If asu = a
s
k 8k, under the optimal job design contract the agent works only on task one,
i.e., T (t) = A18t 2 [0; 1] and w1 = wsu.
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Proof. Let W s be the set of all wsk for k 2 ( 1; ub). For a given job design contract let
Ti = ftjT (t) = Aig. If the agent accepts the contract, he chooses h to maximizeR R 1
0
R
u(wT (t)(; ); h(t))dF (jh(t))dtdG() subject to h(t) 2 Ai if t 2 Ti. Hence, the optimal
h(t) depends only on wT (t). Hence, the expected payo¤ of the principal from task i is independent
from the wages that are o¤ered for other tasks. Therefore, wi 2W s if m (Ti) > 0 where m denotes
the Lebesgue measure. From Assumption 2 it follows that h(t) is constant for all t 2 Ti. Hence
the expected payo¤ of the principal from task i is linear in the time that is allocated to task i.
Note that the exact time allocation does not matter, because payo¤s depend only on how long
the agent works on a task. Since the incentive constraint and (L) have to be satised in every t,
the only reason to allocate time to more than one task is to mitigate the e¤ect of (PC). Since the
objective function and (PC) are linear in m(Ti), the principal cannot gain if she allocates time
to more than two tasks. The remainder of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
The multi-task literature (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) analyzes how incentives for one
task distort the agents allocation of e¤ort across tasks. This e¤ect is absent in the model above.
The reason is not that the principal allocates time across tasks (loosely speaking, in Holmstrom
and Milgrom, the principal does not allocate time but the agent works on all tasks simultaneously)
but the assumption that payo¤s are separable across tasks. Of course, if the agents disutility from
an action is not independent across tasks, assigning two tasks can have a positive or negative e¤ect.
Whether the positive e¤ect from the mitigation of the participation constraint or the e¤ect from
e¤ort substitution dominates depends on the specication of the model. Our result that it can be
optimal to assign two tasks that are very di¤erent is the exact opposite of the conclusions of the
multi-task literature. For tractability reasons, nearly all papers that analyze multi-task situations
use the linear model of Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991. Linear models are special because the
assumption that the agent has CARA utility implies that the outside option does not a¤ect the
second-best contract except for a transfer, i.e., au = ak 8k (and asu = ask 8k if there are multiple
tasks). Therefore, there is no way how randomization or job design can mitigate the participation
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constraint (Proposition 1(iii) and Proposition 2(iii)). Hence, the conclusion of the multi-task
literature that it is never optimal to assign two tasks (or that similar tasks should be grouped
together) does not necessarily hold for di¤erent agency models.
In the real world, randomization is usually not feasible. On the other hand, there exist many
contracts which specify an allocation of tasks. Our results imply that the allocation of tasks can
serve as a substitute for randomization. Consider the example from the beginning of this section
where there exist two tasks i; j. Suppose that each task requires one unit of time and that there
are two agents, each endowed with one unit of time. For simplicity, assume that e¤ort on one task
has no e¤ect on the other task and that there is no cooperation or competition among agents. If
randomization is not feasible and every agent works on one task, then one agent works on task j
with wage wu and earns a net-rent ru > 0. The other agent works on task i and his net-rent is
zero. If both agents spend half of their time on task j with wage wu, they each earn a net-rent
0:5ru on this task. Since ru > 0 and since there is no incentive problem on task i, the principal
can reduce the wage for task i relative to what he has to pay if one agent works only on task i
and still satisfy the participation constraint. Hence if randomization is not feasible, it is optimal
to ask both agents to work on both tasks.
We have shown in section 2 that the outside option is the only factor that determines whether
randomization is optimal. On the other hand, there are many factors which can potentially
a¤ect the optimal allocation of tasks. To simplify the exposition, we concentrate on the e¤ect
of the outside option. The reason why the allocation of tasks can be used as a substitute for
randomization is that their e¤ects with respect to the outside option are similar. Intuitively, since
expected payo¤s are linear in probabilities, a contract that calls for working Monday to Thursday
on task i and Friday on task j is similar to a contract that assigns task i with probability 0:8
and task j with probability 0:2. Hence randomization and job design both allow to implement a
convex combination of either two simple contracts (i.e., randomization) or of two contracts that
specify only one task (job design).
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Proposition 2 shows that the allocation of two tasks to one agent can mitigate the e¤ect of the
participation constraint in the same way as ex-ante randomization. The logic that randomization
and job design can be used to mitigate the e¤ect of the participation constraint also applies in the
rst-best. In the rst-best, the principal maximizes her payo¤ subject to (PC) and (L). Hence the
only reason why randomization and job design can be protable in the rst-best is to mitigate the
e¤ect of the participation constraint. Similar to the second-best contracts described in Proposition
1 and 2, random rst-best contracts randomize only over actions that are implemented in the rst-
best for some outside utility k when randomization is not feasible and rst-best job design contracts
allocate a positive amount of time only to actions and tasks that are implemented in the rst-best
for some outside utility k when the agent can work only on one task.
The multi-task model in section 3 is special since it concentrates on the e¤ect of the participa-
tion constraint but does not consider e¤ort substitution. Besides its tractability, the advantage of
the model is that all second and rst-best contracts consist of probability distributions respective
time allocations across contracts that are optimal if randomization is not feasible respective if the
agent can work only on one task. This allows us to use the results from the extensive literature
on principal-agent models with no randomization and one task to analyze contracts in the more
complex case when randomization is feasible or when there are several tasks.
4 Conclusion
Ex-ante randomization and the allocation of tasks are two seemingly unrelated contractual regimes
that are usually analyzed separately. This paper uses a simple framework to analyze both ex-ante
randomization and the allocation of tasks and to show the similarities between the contractual
environments. Most of the multi-task literature focuses on e¤ort substitution and argues that only
one task should be allocated to an agent (or, more general, that tasks should be homogeneous with
respect to ease of performance measurement). We identify a new rationale that a¤ects the optimal
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allocation of tasks and show that it can be optimal that the agent works on two tasks - even if they
are very di¤erent. Assigning two tasks to one agent can be optimal if it mitigates the e¤ect of the
outside option. Similar, the e¤ect of the outside option is the reason why ex-ante randomization
can be protable. While we rarely observe contracts that include randomization, there exist many
contracts which specify the allocation of tasks. The paper shows that the allocation of tasks can
serve as a substitute for randomization if randomization is not feasible.
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